New PSN Account Exploit Reported
It seems we're not clear of all the hacking idiocy just yet.
Various sources have reported a simple exploit that lets hackers change your password using only your PSN account e-mail and date of birth.
As we all know, that information was compromised when the Network was attacked last month. According to Eurogamer citing Nyleveia.com, Sony has made the PSN sign-in unavailable for several of its websites, including PlayStation.com. For the time being, it's down for maintenance, and Sony issued this statement:
"Unfortunately this also means that those who are still trying to change their password via Playstation.com or Qriocity.com will be unable to do so for the time being. This is due to essential maintenance and at present it is unclear how long this will take. In the meantime you will still be able to sign into PSN via your PlayStation 3 and PSP devices to connect to game services and view Trophy/Friends information."
Sony did make it clear that such maintenance does not affect PSN-enabled consoles; only the website you click through to from the password verification e-mail message. Currently, the recommendation is that you use a new e-mail for your PSN account, as there's no knowing if the hackers - who may have your information - will try to change your password and hijack your account.
We figure Sony will provide some sort of update at some point.
Tags: psn, psn outage, playstation network, psn password
5/18/2011 12:00:36 PM Ben Dutka
Put this on your webpage or blog:
Email this to a friend
Follow PSX Extreme on Twitter
Comments (85 posts)
FatherSun
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 12:24:08 PM
Reply
Last edited by FatherSun on 5/18/2011 12:27:49 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 12:40:48 PM
FatherSun
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 2:35:02 PM
On a related note, I agree with what someone posted on the PSBlog.
Butters360 on May 18th, 2011 at 11:09 am said: Patrick, its high time you as well as Sony start calling out game sites out on their journalistic integrity. There was no hack involved, but go figure EVERY single website is STILL spreadin F.U.D. articles. This is HIGHLY unprofessional. This is serious and we PS3/ PSN users deserve better than this crap.
Sir Stringer kind of went in that direction but there is only so much he can say without backlash and how the internet can twist words. I'm with Sony. All the way.
Last edited by FatherSun on 5/18/2011 2:38:34 PM
jimmyhandsome
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 12:26:59 PM
duomaxwell007
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 12:32:39 PM
So lets hope sony goes back on their word of phase 1 being complete and just get teh store up and running for everyone outside of japan and deal with the japan problem sepertely (wouldnt be the first time sony does the opposite of what they said they would after all right?) Because Im sure theyre not gonan wanna deal with the backlash of their developers losing 6 montshs of revenue because of no PS store.
Clamedeus
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:20:23 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 12:38:35 PM
ace_boon_coon
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 12:48:02 PM
CoolBLKguy
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 2:21:16 PM
frylock25
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:16:21 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 12:37:06 PM
Reply
If I understand the process correctly, an attacker would not only have to have the registered email address, PSN ID and DOB information, but also have access to the email account so that when the reset email is sent, they can pick up the reset value from the email. So unless your email account is compromised, this isn't an issue. Sony have to take the precaution because it's *possible* for the exploit to be used. However given the circumstances, how else did anyone expect to reset their password without a PS3 console to do it on?
So in other words, no one has hacked anything new, this is a precaution taken in response to the vulnerability being reported. If you sit and think about how you handle a password reset, there is only really one way to do it, and that relies on the user having several key pieces of information, as well as sole access to the registered email account. So long as you changed the email account's password after the initial hack this kind of thing should not affect you.
Scarecrow
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 1:35:18 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 2:24:46 PM
Beamboom
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:00:21 PM
Last edited by Beamboom on 5/18/2011 3:01:56 PM
Beamboom
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:09:17 PM
ace_boon_coon
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 12:46:39 PM
Reply
coverton341
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 1:01:18 PM
Reply
What an absolute load of sh!t
Clamedeus
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:10:00 PM
Jdogtoocool
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 1:27:30 PM
Reply
Beamboom
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:03:53 PM
Excelsior1
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 1:33:15 PM
Reply
Last edited by Excelsior1 on 5/18/2011 1:35:08 PM
bigrailer19
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 2:14:07 PM
Reply
"We temporarily took down the PSN and Qriocity password reset page. Contrary to some reports, there was no hack involved. In the process of resetting of passwords there was a URL exploit that we have subsequently fixed.
Consumers who haven’t reset their passwords for PSN are still encouraged to do so directly on their PS3. Otherwise, they can continue to do so via the website as soon as we bring that site back up."
Last edited by bigrailer19 on 5/18/2011 2:14:40 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 2:23:49 PM
Personally, if I were Sony, I'd send an email to all accounts that have not yet reset their password. the email would go to the registered email account, and if there is no answer within 2-3 days, I'd suspend the account and require the user to go through an enhanced verification process to reset their password. For safety's sake, I'd also reset any CC number associated with the suspended account. That would protect consumers and Sony alike.
Jdogtoocool
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 2:33:15 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 2:59:57 PM
Jdogtoocool
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 4:31:36 PM
Sony: whoops hackers just destroyed our services and may have your credit card info, your real name and address, aaand to top it off if you don't respond to this email and go through a long and painful varification process you will not be able to use your account. Have a nice day...idk to me that would be a slap in the face
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 4:55:33 PM
Criminal network hackers recently compromised out network as you may have seen reported in the news media. As communicated via email and our PlayStation Blog, Sony has spent several weeks working around the clock to rebuild PSN security. To maintain user security and prevent unauthorized access, we now require all users to reset their passwords via a secure means. Your password has not yet been reset.
So, we are emailing you as a courtesy reminder to reset your password as soon as possible. We are also informing customers in your situation that we are taking action to protect your data and financial information. Therefore, we are temporarily suspending your account pending a secure password reset. None of your content will be lost, all your trophy and user data is safe.
Out of an abundance of caution, Sony will also remove any credit card data from your account to prevent abuse in the event that a third party fraudulently re-activates your account. We are committed to protecting your data and your account information. Recent attacks on our network have raised awareness of these issues to a new height. We are therefore acting in a corresponding fashion to protect you against possible fraud.
- again, the above is my suggestion of how to communicate such a message, I wrote the message myself, it is *not* from Sony.
Last edited by Highlander on 5/18/2011 4:55:56 PM
Clamedeus
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:00:25 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:01:13 PM
You know the kind of thing.
Last edited by Highlander on 5/18/2011 3:03:06 PM
Clamedeus
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:02:31 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 2:40:45 PM
Reply
It is based on obtaining the specific reset code/token issued by the reset by email process, and then using that in a specific URL to force a password reset, which then prompts you to change the password.
I'm still not clear how you get the token unless you have access to the email. If the process works like every other reset by email process, that token is given out by registered email, not on a web page. But, I've never used that option, so I don't know from personal experience. If the code/token value is handed out via the web page, I can see the issue. If that's the case, then whoever was responsible for checking the password reset option fell down on the job.
Beamboom
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:07:52 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:15:05 PM
Oh, here's a horrible thought, what if the token value was in the URL of the confirmation page? You know how those long URLs can be, just about anything could be hidden in there.
Beamboom
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:26:09 PM
First of all, for the token to be featured in url or source the token value must have already been created before the next page were successfully sent to the user - something they at that point in time can not know if they were able to do at all. It would just be a complete mess if the values were created whenever someone initiated the process. Also, the values of forms and the syntax of urls is like the *very* first thing anyone look at if they want to try and mess with the site. A weak script is a hackers target numero uno.
Secondly, *why* should it be featured in the url? What would that solve?
Thirdly, who would come up with such an idea as a solution?
Last edited by Beamboom on 5/18/2011 3:32:33 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:44:22 PM
Beamboom
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:55:44 PM
These kind of things may be found if the sloppy solution had some kind of advantage to the developer, usually making something easier. But here I see no such advantage here.
Last edited by Beamboom on 5/18/2011 4:05:18 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 4:03:34 PM
Beamboom
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 4:48:42 PM
But if bottom line here is that "if your mail account is compromised then mail based password reset is a Bad Thing", then why is this even a story at all now? What's new? What's "discovered"?
Another thing is, why would anyone not just use the ps3 to change password now after the update?
Last edited by Beamboom on 5/18/2011 4:51:55 PM
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 5:13:30 PM
Still, people persist in suggesting that the website provides the reset code. I never used the password recovery (reset) option before all of this, but it was my understanding that it sent the reset code to you in email. I can't see why this would be any different now.
Last edited by Highlander on 5/18/2011 5:33:46 PM
Beamboom
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 6:38:29 PM
Fane1024
Thursday, May 19, 2011 @ 1:25:52 AM
If you reset your password, it does indeed send you an e-mail message with an embedded link to the page where you can change your password. I don't have enough technical knowledge to give more details (i.e., when the token was given), though.
It didn't allow me to access that page using the PS3 browser (which I had used to check my webmail); it required a PC.
Last edited by Fane1024 on 5/19/2011 1:28:56 AM
Highlander
Thursday, May 19, 2011 @ 2:18:00 AM
Highlander
Thursday, May 19, 2011 @ 2:45:36 PM
I'm in two minds about this because first of all, nothing served by the reset request page should include the reset token that is emailed to the user. that is a very basic flaw in this situation. On the other hand, this illustrates the difficulty of testing everything to prevent an attack or exploit. For this to be tested, someone would have to have another user's registered email address, PSNID and DOB, then they would have to open the reset request page and having requested the reset, copy the cookie created by their browser. Then separately you have to open another page with a specific URL and copy a specific value from the cookie file into the URL. Once that's done, the password get's reset and you can change it's value normally.
So it's a flaw that should not happen, exploited in a non-obvious way. The encouraging thing is that it was discovered very quickly, and Sony yanked it immediately. I dare say that the cookie no longer contains the token, and the URL concerned no longer accepts the token.
But, to go back to my discussion with Beamboom. This is exactly the kind of thing I was worried about when I suggested that the value might be found somewhere in the reset page itself. It's really unthinkable that you would design a reset page in this way. To be honest, if I was the manager in charge of this development, I would expect to be fired, and I would already have fired the coder concerned for gross negligence.
You just do not put the reset code or token into *anything* except the reset email sent to the user's registered email address. You simply do not do it. The value shouldn't even be generated by the code serving the web page. There should be a straight client-server call made to a separate process that creates the code and emails it.
Now, the thing is, this is the kind of coding error that happens *everywhere*. Some system somewhere will have an oversight of this kind in it. Those who lack understanding will scream that this is amateur and castigate Sony as a whole over the error of one or two coders that probably occurred 5 years ago. But in truth, that's neither fair, nor very realistic. It's been fixed now, but the thing about it is, that the scrutiny that found the flaw was not present prior to the attack on PSN. The exploit might never have been found without that additional scrutiny. The reason I am mentioning this is that there are thousands of systems connected to the Internet that contain flaws like this, or even worse. Those flaws remain unknown and possibly will never be discovered because the kind of scrutiny currently applied to Sony is far in excess of that which is applied ordinarily.
That does not excuse Sony, or the mistake. But it puts it into perspective. It's very important to acknowledge that Sony is by no means remarkable in this regard. Or rather, they were not before hand. Now, with the increased scrutiny PSN and other Sony networks are under, their security should be far better than average and getting better incrementally going forward.
Still, the coders and project/team managers responsible for this piece of code probably need to be fired over it, it's a very fundamental design flaw in the process - IMHO.
Last edited by Highlander on 5/19/2011 2:48:40 PM
Fane1024
Friday, May 20, 2011 @ 2:57:03 AM
FWIW I requested the reset on my PS3 (actually it was forced; I tried to change the password and was told it was reset), not on the website. I then went to my e-mail and from there to the password change web page, so I probably didn't get the illicit cookie.
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:01:55 PM
Clamedeus
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:04:29 PM
kraygen
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:04:34 PM
In truth people should just realize that if someone knows how to get into your account than they can change your account, so just do your due diligence and protect yourself.
slugga_status
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 6:27:47 PM
Now my e-mail password and my psn password are completely different and every way possible. I use a 27 character log in for my personal e-mail addy.
When I get out of class I'm going to go home and try to sign in..If it's a no go..I'll let all of you know. Hoping it's just a lag in the reset confirmation from the update..doubt it though...
SirLoin of Beef
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:04:46 PM
Reply
Highlander
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:16:33 PM
Beamboom
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 3:43:47 PM
CrusaderForever
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 4:55:33 PM
Reply
jdt1981
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 5:06:00 PM
Reply
LazyVigilante
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 5:31:16 PM
Reply
BikerSaint
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 7:04:28 PM
Reply
Maybe you can tell me,
OK, still a bit confused about this new info.....
Since my older PS3 was dead, I wound up going through the Killzone stats site on my PC to set up changing my password & I received the email within minutes of doing so
So should my new password be OK, or do you think I need to go back & change my NEW one all over again too.
(BTW, my new password now is much different than all the other passwords I made at every other place).
Highlander
Thursday, May 19, 2011 @ 12:04:05 AM
madmike
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 7:07:04 PM
Reply
BikerSaint
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 7:07:59 PM
Reply
Here's an important question that's stumping me...
OK, once the store is up, & since Sony's got to figure now that almost nobody wants to use a credit card there anymore, then how do you think they'll authorize these new separate accounts for PS+, Netflicks, and/or any other of these new 30 day "Welcome back" services, than just accepting Pre-paid PSN cards????
Have any ideas on how they might go about this now?????
Highlander
Thursday, May 19, 2011 @ 12:02:20 AM
BikerSaint
Thursday, May 19, 2011 @ 12:29:06 AM
Or did you just mean a new redeem code system in place in to to take our charges/PSN cards, or something else entirely?
I mean it's not like they will send us a bill later through the snail mail.
Ok, now I'm officially burned out, time to try putting my brain in freeze-frame on a comfy pillow now.....
Highlander
Thursday, May 19, 2011 @ 1:01:25 AM
Oh, BTW I may let Gophermods have a go at repairing my launch baby. Their use of reflowing and reballing techniques instead of pointing what is little more than a hairdrier on steroids at the motherboard is what make the difference for me. Hopefully with a quick reflow, a good clean and remounting the HSF with Arctic Silver, my launch system will continue to live for another couple of years - until that PS4 decides to arrive.
Last edited by Highlander on 5/19/2011 1:03:55 AM
___________
Thursday, May 19, 2011 @ 3:16:22 AM
Reply
Highlander
Thursday, May 19, 2011 @ 10:09:52 AM
Highlander
Thursday, May 19, 2011 @ 2:25:33 PM
Last edited by Highlander on 5/19/2011 2:26:42 PM

See Full Image









AshT
Reply
Wednesday, May 18, 2011 @ 12:19:44 PM